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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1719 
 ___________ 
 
 ROGER F. DURONIO, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 ROBERT WERLINGER, Warden, F.C.I. Loretto 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 3-09-cv-00289) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
   Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 17, 2011 
 Before:  JORDAN, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: December 14, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Roger F. Duronio, a prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
(BOP), appeals an order of the District Court denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus 
petition.  Having carefully reviewed the record, we are in full accord with the District 
Court and will affirm its order. 
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 Following a 2006 jury trial, Duronio was found guilty of securities fraud and 
computer fraud, and was sentenced to 97 months of confinement followed by three years 
of supervised release.
1
  Other penalties included a $200.00 special assessment, ―which 
shall be due immediately,‖ and a restitution order.  Duronio owed a total of $3,162,376 to 
UBS Financial Services, and the restitution order instructed: 
The restitution is due immediately. It is recommended that the defendant 
participate in the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility 
Program [(IFRP, 28 C.F.R. §§ 545.10–.11)].  In the event the entire 
restitution is not paid prior to the commencement of supervision, the 
defendant shall satisfy the amount due in monthly installments of no less 
than $200.00, to commence 30 days after release from confinement.  The 
Court waived the interest requirement on the restitution payment. 
The order made no mention of Duronio’s payment schedule during the period of 
incarceration.   
Before briefs were filed in Duronio’s direct appeal, he commenced a pro se civil-
rights action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
2
  In that suit, Duronio maintained that the BOP had 
―deprived him of his constitutional right to due process of law under the Fifth 
Amendment . . . by setting [his] restitution schedule of payments and then coercing him 
to meet that schedule of payments under the [IFRP].‖  He claimed that this violated the 
                                                 
1
 See Judgment, United States v. Duronio, D.N.J. Crim. No. 2:02-cr-00933, ECF No. 135 
(entered Dec. 20, 2006).  
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 See Compl., Duronio v. Gonzalez, W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 3:07-cv-00169, ECF No. 1 
(entered July 6, 2007). 
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strictures of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)).  
Duronio relied on our opinion in United States v. Coates, 178 F.3d 681 (3d Cir. 1999), in 
which we emphasized that ―the fixing of restitution payments is a judicial act that may 
not be delegated to a probation officer.‖  Id. at 685. 
 The District Court denied relief in April 2008, and we affirmed.  First, we stressed 
that a direct appeal was the proper path for a challenge of the actual District Court 
restitution plan, as a Bivens remedy would violate the favorable-termination rule of Heck 
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994).  Duronio v. Gonzales, 293 F. App’x 155, 
157 (3d Cir. 2008).  Second, ―[t]o the extent that Duronio challenge[d] the execution of 
his sentence, he should ordinarily proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.‖  Id.  We also 
explained to Duronio that, under the facts adduced, his claim of ―coercion‖ lacked a 
proper legal foundation under Bivens: the privileges lost by failing to participate in the 
IFRP program would not ―trigger a constitutionally protected interest.‖  Id.  Five months 
later, we affirmed Duronio’s conviction and sentence.  See generally United States v. 
Duronio, No. 06-5116, 2009 WL 294377 (3d Cir. Feb. 9, 2009).  
 Since that time, Duronio has commenced two further actions in the District Court: 
1) the present case, a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition attacking the BOP’s ―unlawful 
modification‖ of Duronio’s restitution schedule, see generally Duronio v. Yost, W.D. Pa. 
Civ. No. 3:09-cv-00289; and 2) a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, see generally Mot. to Vacate, 
Duronio v. United States, D.N.J. Civ. No. 2:10-cv-01574, ECF No. 1 (entered Apr. 6, 
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2010), which is still pending at this time.  After the District Court denied his § 2241 
petition, Duronio took a timely appeal. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and to the extent that 
Duronio challenges the execution of his sentence with regard to the BOP’s modification 
of a payment schedule, the claim falls within the purview of a § 2241 petition.
3
  See 
McGee v. Martinez, 627 F.3d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 2010); Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 
485 (3d Cir. 2001).  We ―exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal 
conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its findings of fact.‖ O’Donald v. 
Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see also United States v. 
Friedland, 83 F.3d 1531, 1542 (3d Cir. 1996) (―Our review of the district court’s order 
denying . . . relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is plenary.‖).   
We agree with the Appellee that by ―voluntarily4 entering into the IFRP,‖ Duronio 
―personally provided the BOP the authority to collect‖ restitution funds.  We are aware of 
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 To the extent that Duronio wished to contest the validity of the restitution order itself, 
such a challenge should have been made on direct appeal.  Section 2241 ―cannot be used 
to challenge just the restitution part of a sentence when the custody supporting . . . 
jurisdiction is actual imprisonment.‖  Arnaiz v. Warden, 594 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir. 
2010); see also United States v. Sloan, 505 F.3d 685, 697 (7th Cir. 2007) (―Restitution 
orders that sweep too much conduct into their calculations are issues that must be raised 
on direct appeal . . . .‖). 
 
4
 Throughout, Duronio has maintained that he was functionally ―coerced‖ into entering 
the IFRP program.  As we have explained, however, the penalties associated with ―IFRP 
refuse‖ status are ―reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.‖  See James v. 
Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 630 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Duronio, 293 F. App’x at 157.  
Further, Duronio ―ha[s] no entitlement, constitutional or otherwise, to any of the benefits 
agreeing to participate in the IFRP would provide, such as a work detail outside the 
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no holding that would suggest that an inmate is prohibited from contributing additional 
monies to restitution he owes, especially when doing so—and being placed on IFRP 
status—confers benefits that would otherwise be lost.  If we were to adopt instead 
Duronio’s arguments about the IFRP’s unconstitutionality, we would embrace the absurd 
result of an inmate being unable to gain program benefits because of an allegedly faulty 
(and potentially immutable) District Court order.  We are not confronted with a situation 
in which a restitution program is being imposed upon Duronio against his will.  ―The 
IFRP can be an important part of a prisoner’s efforts toward rehabilitation, but strictly 
speaking, participation in the program is voluntary[;] . . . an inmate in the Bureau of 
Prisons’ custody may lose certain privileges by not participating in the IFRP, but the 
inmate’s participation cannot be compelled.‖  United States v. Boyd, 608 F.3d 331, 334 
(7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).  As we hold that Duronio’s voluntary participation is 
determinative and necessarily defeats his claim, we do not need to reach the Appellee’s 
alternative argument that the BOP may act to obtain restitution payments even under the 
improper delegation of authority we identified in United States v. Corley, 500 F.3d 210 
(3d Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 556 U.S. 303 (2009). 
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
prison perimeter, a higher commissary spending limit, a release gratuity, or pay beyond 
the maintenance pay level.‖  United States v. Lemoine, 546 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 
2008).  To that end, we cannot find that he was coerced into IFRP compliance. 
